A cryptographic hash is an important tool in the area of a modern cryptography. It comprises a compression function, where the compression function can be built by a scratch or blockcipher. There are some familiar schemes of blockcipher compression function such as Weimar, Hirose, Tandem, Abreast, Nandi, ISA-09. Interestingly, the security proof of all the mentioned schemes are based on the ideal cipher model (ICM), which depends on ideal environment. Therefore, it is desired to use such a proof technique model, which is close to the real world such as weak cipher model (WCM). Hence, we proposed an (n, 2n) blockcipher compression function, which is secure under the ideal cipher model, weak cipher model and extended weak cipher model (ext.WCM). Additionally, the majority of the existing schemes need multiple key schedules, where the proposed scheme and the Hirose-DM follow single key scheduling property. The efficiency-rate of our scheme is r = 1/2. Moreover, the number of blockcipher call of this scheme is 2 and it runs in parallel. key words: cryptographic hash, blockcipher, ideal cipher model, weak cipher model, collision and preimage resistance
Introduction
A cryptographic hash is defined as a module that takes an arbitrary length of data and produces a fixed size of data [1] . In the modern cryptography, a cryptographic hash has enormous applications. It is widely used in the digital signatures, message authentication, password verification and file/data identifier [1] - [4] , [21] , [24] . It consists of a compression function, where the blockcipher or scratch can be used [3] , [4] , [14] - [16] . Therefore, the blockcipher compression function is being focused here because of better security bound and higher efficiency than that of the scratch based compression function [5] - [10] . Additionally, the blockcipher compression function is suitable for encryption of a constrained device due to direct implementation of the blockcipher rather than the encryption function [3] , [4] , [10] - [12] . There are some well known properties of the cryptographic compression function such as collision resistance, preimage resistance, efficiency rate, key scheduling and number of blockcipher call, where these properties identify the efficacy and fame of the blockcipher based cryptographic compression function [1] - [3] . Usually, the collision resistance means, it is infeasible to find two inputs where outputs will collide. However, the efficiency rate is defined as r = |m|/(n × #E), where |m| = length of message, n = block-length, #E = number of blockcipher call [3] , [4] . If a single key is used for each iteration of encryption, it is called single key scheduling (KS = 1) [3] , [4] . Additionally, it is also needed to evaluate the number of blockcipher call (#E) for a single message encryption [3] , [4] . Generally, it is desired that r will be close to 1 and the value of KS and #E will be minimum for any better scheme of blockcipher compression function. There are two basic classifications of the blockcipher compression function such as (n, n) and (n, 2n) blockcipher n = block, key length [1] , [2] , [17] , [18] . However, the (n, 2n) blockcipher compression function is suitable in application level because of higher security bound [21] , [23] , [24] .
Motivation. There are some familiar schemes of (n, 2n) blockcipher compression function such as Weimar, Hirose, Abreast, Tandem, Nandi and ISA-09. However, the security proof technique of these schemes depend on the ideal cipher model [3] , [4] , [15] , [16] , [23] , [24] . Usually, the security proof of any crypto-system depends on cryptographic model, where this model is defined on the basis of certain assumptions, primitives, and environments [17] - [20] , [33] . Hence, the security proof of a cryptographic compression function generally depends on the ideal assumptions, which is called ICM or Shanon model [17] , [18] . As a security model, the ICM works well and easy to understand. But it totally depends on the ideal environment, where the adversarial power is limited [19] , [20] . For example, the adversary can make only two types of query such as forward E f and backward E b query for finding collision attack [19] , [20] , [22] . Under this tight circumstance, Hirose et. al. [20] formalized the concept of the weak ideal compression function to the weak cipher model. However, Liscov point out the issue of the weak ideal compression function independently at first in 2006 [19] , where the adversary is allowed to make total three types of query such as E f , E b and E k (key-disclosure query). Therefore, the adversary of WCM is stronger than that of the ICM (details in [17] , [19] , [20] [31] 3n
N.Y. Hirose [3] , [4] 3n → 2n 1 1/2 √ N.Y. N.Y. Abreast [3] , [15] Table 2 A → allowed for Game.
WCM model. Though the adversary can make three types of query but it is only allowed to make a single type of query under a single instance. For example, the adversary is allowed to make only forward query for a single game ( Table 2 and Fig. 1 ). After ending of this game, it will be allowed for backward query or key-disclosure query. On the other hand, the adversary can make two types of query under the ICM but it is allowed for both query under a single instance ( Table 2 and Fig. 1 ). That's why, we think to extend the weak cipher model, where the adversary can make three types of query for any game under a single instance like the ICM (Table 2 and Fig. 1 ).
In the perspective of the efficiency, the efficiency rate of Hirose-DM is 1/2 and it follows single key scheduling (Table 1). However, the collision security bound of Hirose-DM is less than that of the Weimar-DM [3] , [4] . On the contrary, the Weimar-DM needs multiple key scheduling (Table 1). Usually, the number of gates will be increased if any scheme needs multiple key scheduling (details in [10] , [31] ). The efficiency rate of the Nandi and ISA-09 are 2/3 but the collision security bound are less than that of the Weimar and Hirose-DM [3] , [4] . Additionally, the Nandi and ISA-09 need multiple key scheduling (KS = 3). Therefore, there is a scope for a new scheme which can provide higher collision security bound under the ICM, WCM and ext.WCM model. Moreover, the new scheme will satisfy single key scheduling property and higher efficiency rate.
Our Contribution: According to the motivational section, we can claim that our proposed scheme is secure under the three types of security model. Secondly, it follows single key scheduling and it's number of blockcipher call is 2. Additionally, the efficiency rate of proposed scheme is 1/2.
In the perspective of security bound, we use three kinds of security model such as the ICM, WCM and ext.WCM. The ICM depends on the ideal environment, which is far from the real world [34] . Usually, the adversarial behaviour is limited under the ideal environment. Therefore, though the security bound is good under the ICM but it doesn't reflect the real world scenario [30] , [34] . For example, the adversary can make query for plaintext and ciphertext under the ICM. Hence, there is a gap for key-disclosure query, which is being injected into the WCM [17] - [20] . As a result, the WCM is close to the real world, where the adversary gets better freedom than that of the ICM. That's why, it is desire to satisfy the security of blockcipher compression function under the WCM. However, the WCM is better than the ICM, but still it is not close enough to the real world. According to the definition of the WCM, we find that though the adversary can make three types of query but it is restricted for only one type of query under a single instance. As an example, the adversary can make only plaintext query for a single instance. Hence, it can start for the ciphertext or key-disclosure query process after ending the plaintext query process. That's why, we proposed here the ext.WCM, where the adversary can make any type of query under a single instance. Therefore, the ext.WCM goes more close to the real world than that of the WCM.
Preliminaries

Ideal Cipher Model (ICM)
The ideal cipher oracle is denoted by E, where it has n-bit block and k-bit key. If K, M, C is a set of key, message and ciphertext space, then E k (·) |k ∈ K is an operation of a random permutation. The Block k n is a set of all blockciphers from where E is selected randomly. Under the ICM, two types of query are available to an adversary, where the adversary A can ask either E f (forward query) or E b (backward query) to the blockcipher oracle under a single instance (Table 2 and Fig. 1 ). The adversary gets a value of cipher-
for the E f and oppositely it gets plaintext for the E b . It is assumed that the adversary never makes a duplicate query [17] , [18] , [22] .
Weak Cipher Model (WCM)
The weak cipher model [19] , [20] is an extension of the ICM. The assumption and primitive is more weaker than the ICM. The adversary can make the query of E f and E b as like the ICM. Additionally, a key-disclosure E k query can be asked by the adversary, where E (m, c) = k. The WCM environment also ensures that no duplicate query will be executed. Though the adversary can make three types of query but it is restricted to only one type of query for a single instance (Table 2 and Fig. 1 ).
Extended Weak Cipher Model (ext.WCM)
An extended weak cipher model (ext.WCM) has been introduced in this paper. It follows the basic properties of the ICM/WCM. It adds a new feature for making the adversary powerful, where the adversary can ask any type of query for a single instance ( Table 2 and Fig. 1 ). Additionally, the assumptions of the ext.WCM is weaker than the ICM and WCM. Under the ext.WCM, the adversary gets a set of message and corresponding encrypted message (ciphertext) based on a key. However, the query process is based on non-adaptive. The blockcipher oracle is defined as ext. WCM k,m,c (·), where the adversary can ask and gets a set of key (k), message (m) and ciphertext (c).
Collision Resistance
It is difficult for an adversary to find a pair of distinct inputs, such that the hash output will be same. In notational form, it can be deduced as H (in 1 ) = H (in 2 ), when in 1 in 2 in 1,2 = input, H (·) = Hash output . It is assumed that the adversarial advantage will be measured by the number of executed queries from the oracle [3] , [16] , [27] - [29] . Additionally, it is assumed that the adversary doesn't make any similar query such as E
The compression function of cryptographic hash is defined as F, where the blockcipher (E) is replaced into F. According to the adversarial point of view, the function of adversary is to find a collision under the F such as: [17] , [18] , [30] .
Definition of Scheme
The proposed scheme follows the two calls of blockcipher and E lower key . Therefore, the final output of H NEW will be:
Security Proof of Collision Resistance Under the ICM
An adversary A can make two types of query such as forward query E f and backward query E b [17] , [18] , [22] .
Under the ICM, a game will be defined as Game coll ICM (Algorithm 1), where the adversary A will try to find (x, y, m) and (x , y , m ). Therefore, the adversary will win iff H NEW (x, y, m) = H NEW (x , y , m ) where, (x, y, m) (x , y , m ). Additionally, the Game coll ICM will be categorized into three sub-games with their tasks into Table 3 . Hence, the adversary A will play through these three subgames for getting success, where the first subgame stands for dual queries. Under this subgame, the adversary will try to find two different queries for a collision. Secondly, the subgame of subGame coll sole,ICM will be responsible for finding a collision within a single query. Finally, a collision through the initial chaining values will be followed by the third subgame.
Theorem 1: Let H
NEW be a two calls of 2n bit key blockcipher compression function. The task of adversary A is to find a collision under the compression function F H NEW . Hence, after q pairs of queries, the advantage of A will be 
bounded by:
Proof: We allow an adversary A to ask any relevant query but assume that A never makes any duplicate query through E f or E b . It can ask upto l-th queries, where l ≤ q. subGame coll dual,ICM . The adversary A uses the ICM oracle for E f or E b query. At first, the adversary will check whether the most recent query made collision with the previous any queries or not. Let the current iteration is l, where the outputs are x l , y l . For example, l |(l < l ≤ q) is previously executed any iteration and the corresponding output are x l , y l . If (x l , y l ) = (x l , y l ), a trigger will be defined and the subGame coll dual,ICM will be over. Otherwise, the adversary A will store the x l , y l into the query database (Q) and run for next iteration. 
where,
Therefore, the probability of collision under the l-th query will be Pr T ri 
3:
Execution: E f or E b 4:
Answer: from ICM oracle 5:
switch input do 8:
assert(subGame coll dual,ICM ) 10:
if l < l ≤ q then 11:
searching for (x l , y l ) from Q 12: 
Adding 2, 3 and 4, Theorem 1 will be satisfied.
Security Proof of Collision Resistance Under the WCM
An adversary A will make an additional query E k with E f and E b under the WCM, where E k is defined as a key-disclosure query [19] , [20] . According to the WCM, the adversary A will make any relevant query with nonrepetition. A Game coll WCM (Algorithm 2) will be defined for finding collision under the WCM. The target of the adversary A is to find X, Y such that H (X) = H (Y), where X, Y = input, H = hash outout. Additionally, the Game coll WCM will be classified into three subgames (Table 4) , where subGame coll f orw(E f ),WCM is defined for finding collision through ciphertext and subGame coll back(E b ),WCM is used for exploring plaintext. Additionally, the adversary A will execute the game of subGame coll key(E k ),WCM for getting collision through the key-disclosure query.
Theorem 2:
Let H NEW be a two calls of 2n bit key, blockcipher hash function. It invokes the blockcipher based compression function F, where the advantage of the adversary A is to find collision under H NEW (F). Therefore, after q pairs of queries, the adversarial advantage will be bounded by:
Proof: Let A be the adversary that can make query upto l-th queries, where l ≤ q. The collision probability of these three subgames will be evaluated under the adversary A in the following way. 
Branch name Condition
are three basic phases under the subGame coll f orw(E f ),WCM such as making query, checking and trigger/store. In the first phase, the adversary is allowed to make query through E f under the WCM. Then in second phase, A checks whether the last output pair collides with the previous any query pair. The third phase depends on the second phase where a trigger will be called if collision occurs. On the contrary, the output pair will be stored into Q and the adversary will be allowed for next query. For example, the adversary A gets a pair of outputs (x l , y l ) at the l -th iteration. Let there is an another iteration of l| (l < l), where output pair will be x l , y l . If (x l , y l ) = (x l , y l ) then a collision will be occurred and a trigger tri coll E f ,WCM will be called. However, the sets of queries are:
Hence, the conditions of collision are:
From 5, the collision probability will be: , the collision probability will be:
The explanation of probability of subGame coll key(E k ),WCM is as that of the subGame coll f orw(E f ),WCM . Therefore, the probability of collision will be:
If, 10 and 11 occurs then outer tri 
From 12, there is a possibility for a collision such as (x l , y l ) = (x 0 , y 0 ). Therefore, the probability of collision will be:
Theorem 3 will be proved after summing the values of 13, 17 and 18.
Result Analysis
The proposed scheme satisfies the two calls of 2n bit blockcipher, where the number of cycle is two. The collision security bound of this scheme is q = 2 125.31 under the ICM q = number of queries . The probability of adversarial advantage comes from Theorem 1, which is used for finding the number of queries.
Let N = 2 n and Adv due to birthday attack . Therefore, the value of q will be 2 125.31 under the ICM. In similar way, the total number of queries under the WCM and ext.WCM will be evaluated and mentioned in Table 6 .
Conclusion
There are many studies on the blockcipher cryptographic hash compression function where the security proof model plays an important role [17] , [18] , [20] , [29] , [30] , [34] . Usually, the ICM is used as a model for the security proof, that depends on the ideal environment [3] - [5] , [11] , [12] , [14] , [16] , [23] , [24] , [34] . However, the ICM is far away from the real world scenario [29] , [34] . Therefore, it is obvious to use the security proof model, which is close to the real world such as the WCM [19] , [20] and ext.WCM. Currently, none of the existing schemes are secure under more than one security proof model. In this article, the proposed (n, 2n) blockcipher compression function is secure under three types of security proof model such as the ICM, WCM and ext.WCM (Table 6 ). The proposed scheme follows single key scheduling under the Matyas Meyer mode. The efficiency rate and number of calling blockcipher are respectively 1/2 and 2. However, the proposed scheme is not suitable for small message encryption and also it can not encrypt without padding. Additionally, this scheme is secure only under the Maytas Meyer Mode. Hence, there is a chance to provide a scheme which will be suitable for small domain encryption as well as padding free encrytion. Additionally, it will be secure under any mode of the PGV [17] , [18] .
